As we have seen, British policymakers have attracted the notion of an Arab Caliphate but were also deeply suspicious of any pan-Islamic iteration thereof. They preferred that an Arab Caliph is a spiritual, rather than a temporal head of Islam. The idea of a Caliphate as related to the Sherifian revolt remained part of British policy through 1917.

On 16 November 1916 conference was held in Rabegh where it was decided to defend Rabegh, since it was seen as the key to the route to Mecca on one hand and the base for the three Arab armies’ operations on the other. However when in December the newly created War Cabinet decided to delegate the responsibility for sending a brigade to Sir Reginald Wingate, the latter, although he had been the most ardent advocate of the scheme, promptly shifted it onto Hussein, who in the meantime had been proclaimed ‘King of the Arab Nation’, his precarious position notwithstanding. By the middle of January 1917, it was evident that Hussein would not permit British troops to land in the Hijaz. This proved to Wingate’s satisfaction that, if the Arab revolt collapsed, the blame lay firmly on Hussein’s shoulders.

Less mentioned, Ibn Saud was another player in the Arabian Peninsula that enjoyed the support of the British. He was gradually assuming control of the central and eastern provinces of the peninsula with encouragement and support from the Anglo-India Office. The latter was mindful of the need to preserve and safeguard routes to India, and had been looking to the possibility of air routes being opened up between Britain and India. It also was crucial to British interests that the whole of the peninsula, not just the Hejaz on the western boundary of the peninsula, should be friendly to the British.

The ‘Arab’ and the ‘Jewish’ question

On 1 September 1916, a French mission arrived at Alexandria on its way to the Hijaz. It was headed by Colonel Edouard Brémond, according to T.E. Lawrence ‘a practicing light in native warfare’ who had been ‘a success .in French Africa’.¹ However, it was not as a soldier that Brémond would establish a reputation in the Hijaz. He did not conceal from his British interlocutors that Hussein’s revolt should not grow into something bigger than the local affair that it was. Cyril Wilson reported to Wingate on 24 October that Brémond believed that ‘the longer the Arabs take to capture Medina the better for Great Britain and France owing to the Syrian question probably then becoming acute’.² At that moment, there was naturally not the slightest chance that Hussein’s forces would capture Medina. The chances were far greater that Britain and France would have to intervene militarily to prop up Hussein’s tottering regime. Regarding the Rabegh question, Brémond was in favor of sending a Franco–British force. According to Lawrence, however, this was not as a means to save the sheriff’s revolt, but because the landing of Christian troops would make Husayn’s position untenable in Muslim eyes. In the same memorandum that Murray and Robertson so eagerly seized on to torpedo the plans to send troops to Rabegh, Lawrence also observed that Brémond considered it vital that ‘the Arabs must not take Medina. This can be assured if an Allied force landed at Rabegh. The tribal contingents will go home, and we will be the sole bulwark of the Sherif in Mecca. At the end of the war, we give him Medina as his reward.’³

T.E. Lawrence found a sympathetic ear for his observations with Sir Henry McMahon, Sir Archibald Murray, and Wingate. Each of them approached the home authorities on the matter. McMahon wrote to Lord Hardinge that Brémond had confided to Lawrence that the French object with the brigade ‘was to thus disintegrate Arab effort, as they by no means wished to see them turn the Turks out of Medina any sooner than could be avoided […] It is of course always the old question of Syria’.⁴ Murray for his part warned Sir William Robertson that the French attitude towards Hussein’s revolt was based on the ‘fear that if the Sherif is successful in turning the Turks out of the Hijaz they will find that the Arabs pro- pose to operate in Syria. This would not suit them.’⁵ Wingate wired to the Foreign Office that the French worried about Hussein’s possible capture of Medina ‘given their future Syrian policy’. The occupation of Medina would lead to the ‘active support of all Arab tribes in the Syrian hinterland who have sworn to rise in Shereef’s favor immediately Medina is in his hands’.⁶ These telegrams, reports, and letters, however, did not initiate a policy revision concerning French ambitions in Syria. The machinations of the head of the French mission in the Hijaz were completely irrelevant in view of the supreme aim of preserving cordial relations with France. Lawrence’s observation that Brémond favored a landing at Rabegh to discredit Hussein was completely ignored during the meeting of the War Committee on 20 November, where his report and person were extensively discussed. Lawrence’s remarks on Brémond were moreover deleted from the report that George Clerk compiled at the request of the War Committee for the benefit of the French government,⁷ not only out of consideration for French feelings, but also, as Clerk minuted on Wingate’s telegram the next day, because ‘we have little evidence to support the theory that the French do not want the Sherif to take Medina, I find it hard to credit’.⁸ The source of these messages was, moreover, considered suspect. Sykes’s reaction to a report by Wilson was typical. Wilson related that a member of the British mission at Jedda had been informed that during a conversation between members of the French mission and Rashid Rida, the latter had told the French that ‘everybody in Egypt loathes the British and how overjoyed the Syrians were at the French joining the Arab movement as their Friend, etc.’ This made Sykes burst out in anger. In a letter to Hardinge he railed against the type of Englishmen who permitted the French ally to be spied on. This he blamed on the fact that ‘our people in Egypt, still think that there is a chance of getting Syria’. It was high time they realized that to the Arab cause ‘cooperation between French and British is more important than Rabegh’. Sykes suggested that ‘a very definite instruction should go to the sirdar urging him to see to frank and trustful cooperation among the officers of the two missions’. Wingate was accordingly informed that ‘it would seem desirable to impress upon your subordinates the need for the most loyal cooperation with the French whom His Majesty’s Government do not suspect of ulterior designs in the Hijaz’.⁹

This was the end of the affair as far as the Foreign Office was concerned. After this reprimand, Wingate and Wilson did not return to this subject other than Wingate transmitting Wilson’s assurance that he was ‘well aware of the necessity for loyal cooperation and that this policy will be scrupulously adhered to by me’.¹⁰ A report by Lawrence on a conversation between Faisal and Brémond, however, provided a good opportunity to make a fresh at- tempt to open the home authorities’ eyes to the problem. Brémond had observed to Faisal that he should not forget that ‘the firmness and strength of the present bonds between the allies did not blind them to the knowledge that these alliances were only temporary and that between England and France, England and Russia, lay such deep and rooted seeds of discord that no permanent friendship could be looked for’. Who exactly, so Wingate wrote to Balfour, was jeopardizing the all important British–French cooperation? The people in Cairo, who ‘loyally observed the policy of “hands off” in matters Syrian’, and scrupulously saw to it that ‘our policy and that of the French are, and will remain closely coordinated’, or Colonel Brémond, who ‘in conversation with the Arab leaders, has not scrupled to convey to them a contrary impression’? This time the Cairo authorities did not confine themselves to dispatching letters. On the suggestion of Wilson it was decided to send Captain George Lloyd, MP, to London. Lloyd, who had served in the Hijaz in the previous months, was entrusted with the task to explain that Brémond and his staff were responsible for the recurring problems in the Hijaz, and that more was at stake than a purely local affair.

The Foreign Office again refused to take the matter very seriously. Although Hardinge was now prepared to admit that Brémond had shown himself to be ‘unreliable and untrustful’, the forthcoming mission by Sykes and Georges-Picot would soon set matters right, the more so as Picot had told Sir Ronald Graham that he intended to assume control of affairs in the Hijaz. The instructions of Sykes and Georges-Picot constituted a faithful reflection of the Foreign Office’s policy towards the Middle East, with which Sir Mark completely identified. Everything turned on cordial relations between France and Britain. British diplomacy should spare no effort to accommodate French susceptibilities, whether these were justified or not. This was the reasoning be- hind McMahon’s convoluted formulations in his letters to Hussein in the autumn of 1915. This also explained the procedure of first coming to an agreement with France before the negotiations with Hussein could be finalized. This did not mean that Grey, Sykes and Foreign Office officials were blind to the problems that this policy entailed, but these counted for little compared to the all important objective of good relations with France. Bal- four’s minute on Wingate’s dispatch on Brémond’s machinations, however, indicated that he was less attached to this orthodoxy: ‘I think if the French intrigues go on in the Hedjaz we shall have to take a strong line. They may find us interfering in Syria if they insist on interfering in Arabia.’¹¹

‘A Whole Crowd Of Weeds Growing Around Us’

Balfour’s minute constituted a first indication that British Middle East policy would change after Grey had left the Foreign Office. This was for the greater part due to the increasing meddling in foreign affairs by members of the War Cabinet, Prime Minister Lloyd George in particular, as well as the establishment of the interdepartmental Middle East Committee, subsequently the Eastern Committee, chaired by Curzon.¹² Balfour dominated British foreign policy-making to a far lesser extent than Grey had done in his days. In the early spring of 1917, matters still hung in the balance. For the time being Brémond could continue to make a nuisance of himself in the Hijaz.  The Failure of the ‘Projet d’Arrangement’ Sykes’s arrival in Egypt heralded the reversal of the Foreign Office’s attitude towards the complaints from Cairo about the French mission. From that moment on these were no longer treated as utterances by biased men on the spot who tried to blow up incidents to further their own Syrian ambitions. On 8 May 1917, Sykes – who at the beginning of March had already written to Wingate that he had ‘seen the George Lloyd correspondence and George Lloyd, truly Bremond’s performances have been disgusting’¹³ – telegraphed to Graham that after a careful investigation he had reached the conclusion that ‘the sooner French Military Mission is removed from Hedjaz the better’. The ‘deliberately perverse attitude and policy’ on the part of Brémond and his staff constituted the main obstacle in the way of Sir Mark’s attempts to improve relations between the French and the Arabs. These men were:  Without exception anti-Arab and only serve to pro- mote dissension […] Their line is to crab British operations to Arabs, throw cold water on all Arab actions and make light of the King to both. They do not attempt to disguise that they desire Arab failure. Without assistance I do not believe Picot will be strong enough to carry the day […] I suggest there- fore that His Majesty’s Government make representations that French military mission in Hedjaz has now fulfilled its purpose […] and that it should be brought to an end.

Sir Mark’s recommendation was not ignored by the Foreign Office. Four days later, Lord Bertie was instructed to impress on the French government that the mission to the Hijaz be withdrawn in view of the open enmity Brémond and his staff displayed towards the Arab cause, which ‘cannot but prejudice Allied relations and policy in the Hedjaz and may even affect whole future of French relations with the Arabs’.¹⁴ It took almost a fortnight before Bertie received a reply. In the meantime, the Foreign Office was informed of the instructions given to Si Mustapha Cherchali, an Algerian notable who was to leave for the Hijaz on a mission principally concerned with ‘purely Muslim affairs’. These confirmed that more was at stake than some local incidents. Besides instructions concerning the mission’s primary objective, there were instructions of a more general political nature. These were ‘of much greater importance and raise whole question of Franco–British relations in Arabia’, as they made clear that ‘French now de- sire to limit their recognition of our special position in Arabia to an admission of our preponderant commercial interests’:

France, in agreement with England, desires only to maintain on the one hand the independence of the Sherif, and on the other hand the integrity of his possessions. We feel as do our Allies, that no European Power should exercise a dominant or even preponderating influence in the holy places of Islam and we are resolved not to intervene in political questions affecting the Arabian Peninsula. We feel, moreover, in full accord with our Allies, that no European government should acquire a new foothold (établissement) in Arabia. While feeling that no Power should obtain either new territory or political prestige in Arabia, the French government recognize that the proximity of Egypt and the Persian Gulf creates a situation in favor of the commercial interests of the English Allies which you should bear in mind.

It was, in particular, this last sentence that Graham found unacceptable. If the French position was not challenged, then the door was wide open to, as Hardinge had formulated it in November 1916, ‘the reversal of our policy of the last 100 years which has aimed at the exclusion of foreign influence on the shores of the Red Sea’. According to Sir Ronald:  We can admit that no European Power should exercise a predominant influence in the holy places. But the French note goes much further than this in laying down that no Power is to obtain new territory or political prestige in Arabia and in limiting French recognition of our special position there to commercial interests. Hitherto the French have always recognized our special political position […] I fear we must conclude that the French desire to go back on this attitude and to claim an equality of political position with us in Arabia – when they had no position at all and owe any improvement that they have latterly achieved in this respect entirely to our help and influence. Such a submission, which is a poor return for our rapport, must be strongly resisted.  Graham proposed to consult Wingate on Cherchali’s instructions, as well as the most appropriate reaction. Cecil agreed but cautioned that the reply had to be formulated with the greatest care, as ‘it will be a definite statement of Franco–British relations in Arabia’.¹⁵ Wingate’s reaction to Cherchali’s instructions was along the same lines as Graham’s minute. He also believed that ‘we must insist on formal recognition by French government of our preponderant position in Arabia’. The French apparently threatened to forget that ‘only by our support military as well as diplomatic, can they expect to realize their present aims in Near East and, in particular, that our continued good offices with King Hussein and Syrian Moslems will be essential to an amicable settlement of Syrian question’.

Sykes, for his part, proposed his customary solution, to let Georges-Picot and him work out an arrangement. Lancelot Oliphant and Graham were not sure. According to Oliphant, Sykes, in any case, should ‘cease to be a free lancer’, and as far as Picot was concerned, he was ‘far from easy in my own mind as to the extent that M. Picot speaks for his own government (or even for himself) in talking to Sir M. Sykes’. Sir Ronald doubted ‘whether M. Picot exerts such a beneficent influence in the French government as Sir M. Sykes represents’. However that may be, there was ‘little prospect of their doing anything more where they are at present’. Sykes was accordingly instructed on 5 June ‘to proceed to London without stop- ping in Paris’. Two days later, the French government was requested also to recall Georges-Picot for further consultations.¹⁶ In a dispatch to Balfour, dated 11 June 1917, Wingate returned to the subject. The Sykes–Picot agreement was ‘unsatisfactory and inadequate in one, to my mind, all- important point of strategy’. It had not settled the British position in the Red Sea, while ‘our position here must be unassailable or we run the risk of creating a “Baghdad Railway” question in the Red Sea the development of which may gravely impair our relations with France and Italy and even menace the security of our imperial system’. Wingate’s remedy had two aspects, which he had most succinctly formulated in a telegram sent the day before:  Our policy should be to obtain French recognition of our predominant position in Arabian Peninsula as a preliminary to concluding a treaty with King Hussein which, whilst not impairing his independence vis-à- vis of Moslem world, will prevent any foreign power under guise of pilgrim interest from acquiring rights and privileges detrimental to our special political and economic interests in the Hedjaz.¹⁷

According to Sir Reginald, Hussein at the end of the day was no more than one of the many chiefs on the Arabian Peninsula. It was ‘very necessary to make a clear distinction between practical politics and propaganda’. He, therefore, did not see, ‘in view of the fact that we have created, directed and financed the Arab revolt’, why it would not be possible to conclude a treaty like the one he pro- posed. Naturally, ‘we must be careful to create and pre- serve, for as long as may be necessary, the facade of an independent Arab Empire’, as ‘an Arab caliph or imam buried away in the sands of the Arabian desert (would) appeal to Moslems nowhere’, but this did not imply that with the king no agreement could be signed ‘differing little from those we have made with the Trucial Chiefs’.¹⁸

To Sykes, however, it was unthinkable that Hussein would be treated on the same footing as the other rulers on the Arabian Peninsula. He argued that ‘if there is to be a King of Hejaz he must be independent of all foreign control otherwise he has no value or influence and is only a danger’. When Britain would ‘reduce him to the position of a feudatory chief in our pay, then we not only destroy the Arab movement but we throw the whole control of the Moslem world into the hands of the Turks, the pan-islamists, the seditionists and the Egyptian revolutionary nationalists’.¹⁹ Graham voiced the same argument in less alarmist terms in a minute on a further telegram by Wingate, in which the latter again urged a revision of the Sykes–Picot agreement in order ‘to eliminate present southern boundary of Area B’.

Sir Ronald believed that it was not in the interest of Great Britain ‘to assume publicly anything in the nature of a sort of British Protectorate over the holy places and the Shereef, who may well be caliph some day. To do so would destroy or at any rate weaken his position and land us in an embarrassing situation in the future.’ The revision advocated by Wingate was moreover completely unnecessary, since ‘our presence in Egypt close by, the great number of British native pilgrims as compared with those of any other State and our intimate existing relations with the Sherif and his family – financial and political – render it inevitable that we should enjoy a special position with him and in the Hedjaz’. Britain’s policy should be to get the other powers to give an undertaking that they would refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of the Hijaz. Hardinge concurred. Provided that ‘no foreign Power is allowed to obtain a preponderating influence in the Hedjaz we may regard with serenity the fact that it is not our protectorate […] We shall in the end by force of circumstances obtain a very strong position in the Hedjaz as the main support of the Sheriff’.²⁰ After Harold Nicolson had completed a first draft for a reply to the French memorandum with Cherchali’s instructions on 14 June, the question was referred to the Mesopotamian Administration Committee (MAC).²¹ This committee had been established by the War Cabinet on 16 March 1917. Besides Curzon as chairman and Sykes as secretary, it consisted of Lord Alfred Milner, Hardinge, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Sir Thomas Holderness, Graham and Clerk. Sir Henry McMahon also became a member. The MAC had initially only dealt with the organization of the administration of the occupied territories in Mesopotamia, but it had soon been felt that it should have greater authority. The occasion had been Wingate’s dispatch of 11 June. On 7 July, Sir Eric Drummond wrote to Sir Maurice Hankey that Balfour wanted an extension of the MAC’s powers, ‘so as to enable it to deal with other questions such as Arabia, Hedjaz, etc. The idea is I believe to form a Committee of which the S. of S. for F.A. and the S. of S. for India will be permanent members in order to decide all Middle Eastern matters. It is a good scheme.’²² The War Cabinet accepted Balfour’s proposal a week later. At this meeting, Milner relinquished his seat, and the DMI was appointed as the military representative on the committee.²³ It was also decided to change the committee’s name into the Middle East Committee (MEC). On 23 August, Hardinge submitted to Cecil a new draft reply. It was in line with a memorandum written by Curzon. As ‘the matter is urgent, and has already been subject to much delay’, Hardinge proposed to settle the question right away. Cecil, however, hesitated to ‘authorise this draft in the absence of Mr Balfour’, but it was finally approved, with some minor revisions, on 28 August.²⁴

Sykes did not like the approved reply at all. He complained to Graham that:  It is very ridiculous to adopt a 1960 A.D. policy in India and a 1887 A.D. policy in the Red Sea. We certainly do not require any rights in HEJAZ over and above those to be enjoyed by our allies. The HEJAZ must be a completely independent state if we are to defeat the Turks. It will never be independent if we have a special position there, and the Sharif will always be our dependant and therefore out of the running for the caliphate; which is contrary to our interests because it fastens the caliphate for good and all onto the Turks.  It was his opinion that the best thing would be, as always, to let Picot and him settle the matter. But Clerk, who substituted for Graham, was not entirely convinced of this. It was one thing to show consideration for French ambitions, but it was quite another to give up British interests without getting anything in return:  Throughout these Asia Minor and Arabian negotiations it has seemed to me that Sir Mark Sykes, while quite rightly endeavoring to reach an understanding with the French which shall be free from all suspicion and misunderstanding, has gone to work on the wrong principle. He appears to think that the way to get rid of suspicion is always to recognize what the other party claims and to give up, when asked, our claims. For many years our relations with Germany were run on those lines. My own belief is that the right course is to be as accommodating as possible, and ready to recognize the legitimate claims of other people, but to be both frank and tenacious about those things which are held to be vitally necessary to the existence of the British Empire.

Hardinge fully agreed. There was nothing in Sykes’s letter to modify the approved note, and ‘thanks to the Sykes– Picot agreement our position is already a bad one in connection with Asiatic Turkey and Arabia, and for heaven’s sake let us not make it even worse’.²⁵ The British memorandum on Cherchali’s instructions was handed to Cambon on 29 August. Although Graham considered the French reply of 18 September ‘not altogether clear’, British claims were recognized in principle, and accordingly it ‘foreshadows an agreement which may prove satisfactory’. Hardinge believed that ‘the note is on the whole better than might have been expected’. His disparaging remark several weeks before notwithstanding, Hardinge accepted Graham’s suggestion to send Sykes to Paris in order ‘to draw up an agreement “ad referendum”’, be it with ‘definite instructions’. These were telegraphed to Bertie on 26 September. Sir Mark was directed to draw up a draft agreement ‘respecting future status of the Hejaz and Arabia’. The most important British desiderata in this agreement were:

a.  That [it] is essential to obtain explicit recognition by France of British political supremacy in Arabia as a whole with the exception of the Hedjaz.

b.  That the limits of the Hedjaz shall be defined.

c.  That within those limits Hedjaz shall be recognized as a sovereign, independent State but that the existing arrangements for dealing with King Hussein and the Arabs shall hold good for the duration of the war.

d.  That France on her part shall undertake to enter in no Agreement with the King or Government of Hedjaz on any matter concerning the Arabian Peninsula or the Red Area or Area B (Anglo– French Agreement of May 1916) without the knowledge and consent of Great Britain.

e.  That Great Britain on her part shall undertake to enter into no Agreement with the King or Government of Hedjaz on any matter concerning either the Blue Area or Area A (Anglo–French Agreement of May 1916) without the knowledge and consent of France.²⁶

Even though these instructions evidently reflected the accursed spirit of ‘1887 A.D.’, within a week Sykes and Picot managed to complete a draft agreement (Projet d’Arrangement) that, in the words of Clerk, ‘seems to cover the instructions sent to M. Sykes pretty well’. The most important point was that the French government were finally prepared explicitly to recognize Britain’s special interests in the Arabian Peninsula, and confirmed its intention ‘not to seek any political influence in these regions’. Hardinge noted with satisfaction that the French were ‘ready to accept our political supremacy in the Arabian Peninsula, with the exception of the Hedjaz’, which was ‘a point gained’. Especially when one took into account that regarding the Hijaz, ‘owing to the close connection of the holy places with Egypt, Aden and Mesopotamia [there should] be no difficulty for us in acquiring and eventually asserting a position of predominance there also’.²⁷ Apart from a few minor points that needed modification, the desired supplement to the Sykes–Picot agreement with respect to the Arabian Peninsula seemed finally to be within reach. The French government, however, failed to ratify the draft agreement. Although the Quai d’Orsay time and again confirmed that the Council of Ministers could approve the arrangement any moment, they failed to do so. On 4 December, the Foreign Office replied to Wingate, after the latter had enquired how matters stood, that ‘exchange of notes has not yet actually taken place, but it is hoped to complete arrangement within the next fortnight’.²⁸ However, this hope, too, was dashed.

1.T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (London, 1977: Penguin), p. 113; cf. also Général E. Brémond, Le Hedjaz dans la guerre mondiale (Paris, 1931: Payot), pp. 35–44, and Dan Eldar, ‘French policy towards Husayn, Sharif of Mecca’, Middle Eastern Studies, 26 (1990), pp. 337–8.

2.  Tel. Wilson to Wingate, no. W. 394, 24 October 1916, Wingate Papers, box 141/3.

3. G.O.C.-in-C., Egypt to D.M.I, no. I.A. 2629, 17 November 1916, Cab 42/24/8; cf. also Eldar, ‘French policy’, p. 339.

4. McMahon to Hardinge, 21 November 1916, Hardinge Papers, vol. 27.

5. Murray to Robertson, 28 November 1916, Add. Mss. 52462.

6. Tel. Wingate to Grey, no. 29, 23 November 1916, FO 371/2776/236128.

7. See Grey to Bertie, no. 779, 22 November 1916, FO 371/2776/232712.

8. Minute Clerk, 23 November 1916, FO 371/2776/ 236128.

9. Sykes to Hardinge, 21 November 1916, minutes Clerk, 22 November 1916, and Hardinge, not dated, and tel. Hardinge to Wingate, private, 24 November 1916, FO 371/2779/233854.

10. Tel. Wingate to Hardinge, private, 27 November 1916, Wingate Papers, box 143/4.

11. Wingate to Balfour, private, 11 February 1917, and minutes Hardinge, not dated, Graham, 24 February 1917, and Balfour, not dated, FO 371/3044/40845.

12. See also Roberta M. Warman, ‘The erosion of Foreign Office influence in the making of foreign policy, 1916–1918’, The Historical Journal, 15/1 (1972), pp. 133–59.

13. Sykes to Wingate, 6 March 1917, Sykes Papers, box 2.

14. Sykes to Graham, no. 23, in tel. Wingate to Balfour, no. 497, 8 May 1917, and tel. Balfour to Bertie, no. 1243, 12 May 1917, FO 371/3051/93348.

15. French Embassy to Foreign Office, 16 May 1917, reprinted in John Fisher, Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916–1919 (London, 1999: Frank Cass), pp. 313–16, tel. Balfour to Wingate, no. 540, 29 May 1917, and minutes Graham, 21 May 1917 and Cecil, not dated, FO 371/3056/100065.

16. Tel. Wingate to Balfour, no. 583, 3 June 1917, minutes Oliphant, 4 June 1917, Graham, not dated, tels Balfour to Wingate, no. 571, 5 June 1917, and Balfour to Bertie, no. 1521, 7 June 1917, FO 371/3056/110589.

17. Wingate to Balfour, no. 127, 11 June 1917, FO 371/3054/125564, and tel. Wingate to Balfour, no. 609, 10 June 1917, FO 371/3054/115603.

18. Wingate to Balfour, no. 127, 11 June 1917, FO 371/3054/125564.

19. Minute Sykes, 22 June 1917, on tel. Wingate to Balfour, no. 609, 10 June 1917, Cab 21/60.

20. Tel. Wingate to Balfour, no. 696, 3 July 1917, minutes Graham and Hardinge, not dated, FO 371/3056/131922.

21. See Nicolson, ‘Draft for a Note to the French ambassador’, 14 June 1917, FO 371/3056/132784.

22. Drummond to Hankey, 7 July 1917, Cab 21/60.

23. Minutes War Cabinet, 13 July 1917, Cab 23/3.

24. Minutes Hardinge and Cecil, not dated, FO 371/3056/165801.

25. Sykes to Graham, not dated, and Clerk to Hardinge, 28 August 1917, minute Hardinge, not dated, FO 371/3044/168691.

26. Memorandum French Embassy, 18 September 1917, minutes Graham and Hardinge, not dated, and tel. Balfour to Bertie, no. 2387, 26 September 1917, FO 371/3056/181851.

27. Minutes Clerk, 8 October 1917, and Hardinge, not dated, on ‘Projet d’Arrangement’, 3 October 1917, FO 371/3056/191542.

28. Tel. Balfour to Wingate, no. 1152, 4 December 1917, FO 371/3056/227997